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Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has raised the possibility of selling Venezuela's U.S.-based
oil company, CITGO Petroleum Corp., to finance ambitious state programs. Chávez has said the
company's sale could raise at least $10 billion for the state's stretched coffers, though many
analysts suggest it is valued at far less. Is Chávez likely to sell CITGO and, if so, how much
would the company reasonably fetch? What impact would the sale have on the Venezuelan
economy in the near future? What effects would it have on Venezuela's long-term interests?
A: Luis E. Giusti, senior advisor at the Center for Strategic & International Studies
and former chairman and CEO of PDVSA:
"Buying and selling refineries is a normal activity in the oil industry. Different from the
production segment, the refining business is one of small margins and it tends to be cyclical.
Building a grassroots refinery takes four years, making investment decisions difficult because it
is not easy to estimate market risks. With oil prices of $90/barrel, the refining business is
undergoing a rough ride and refiners are struggling to maintain their profits. On the other hand,
this is a bad time to sell refineries. In addition to those fundamental issues, there is another angle
to the ownership and operation of refineries. Big players on the upstream normally operate
refining networks in order to have a vertically integrated business from the well to the sales of
refined products. This will provide them with guaranteed niches for their oil and help them
optimize profits. It was along those lines that in the 1980s, Petróleos de Venezuela began
acquiring, at very good prices, refinery installations abroad, first in Europe and later on in the
United States, in what eventually was amalgamated under CITGO. The discussion about a
possible sale of CITGO is not easy, because there is no reliable information available about the
motivations and conditions. During the current administration, CITGO has already sold its
participation in CITGO-Lyondell in Texas and in two asphalt refineries in the east coast. A
refinery in Chicago has always been a candidate for sale, because of oil supply restrictions. But
the core of CITGO is in the large refineries in Lake Charles and Corpus Christi, in addition to the
joint venture with Chevron in Pascagoula. The relevant questions to ask are: What is the sale
price? Why sell at this bad moment? What are the implications for oil supplies and sales,
especially concerning price?"

A: Jorge Piñon, former president of Amoco Oil Latin America and research fellow
at Florida International University:
"From 1986 to 1998, PDVSA acquired a number of U.S. oil refining assets, eventually
controlling more than 1.3 million barrels per day, or 8 percent, of the United States total operable
refinery capacity. In 2005, President Hugo Chávez announced the start of a divestment initiative
of its overseas oil refining investments and a reversal of the earlier strategy of vertical integration
established by PDVSA. We believe that, even though the refining business has been
characterized by its rollercoaster profit margins, the possible sale of CITGO follows more a
central government political directive rather than an economic or business strategy set by the
national oil company. The sales by PDVSA of its equity shares in U.S.-based Lyondell in 2006
and its Ruhr Oel German assets earlier this year set a market price range of around $5,000-6,000
a barrel per stream day. New grassroots complex refinery capacity construction costs are
estimated to be around $15,000-20,000 a barrel per stream day. We estimate that the sale of
CITGO could generate $4.5 billion to $7.5 billion for Venezuela and most probably would also
require a long-term supply of Venezuelan crude equal to its current levels of around 400 mbd. A
combination of factors such as complexity, cash flow (income), replacement value and, most
importantly, the intangible strategic value assigned by the future buyer, will determine the final
sale price of CITGO. The most important impact to PDVSA's short-term financial position will
not be the sale of CITGO, but the 26 percent increase in its crude oil export prices from an
average of $57.01 per barrel for 2009 to $71.67 per barrel in 2010, well above the $40 per barrel
price level set for the 2010-2011 national budget."
A: Gustavo Coronel, former member of the board of directors of PDVSA:
"Hugo Chávez will attempt to sell CITGO for three main reasons: (1) He needs money
urgently to finance his drive for re-election in 2012, (2) He worries about having important assets
on U.S. soil, vulnerable to potential legal action by the U.S. government or companies, and (3)
The sale would be one more way to show his contempt for the United States. PDVSA's
commercial strategy is totally subordinate to Chávez's political strategy and he will try to sell
CITGO at almost any price, but in cash. Pemex could be interested but might not have the
money. Price will not be dictated by the true value of the company, which is between $7 billion
and $8 billion, but by Chávez's political urgency. CITGO could go for $4 billion to $5 billion if
they find a buyer willing to face the associated legal, political and supply risks of the transaction.
The impact of the sale of CITGO in the near term would be psychological and financial. It would
represent a new step in the progressive liquidation and collapse of the Venezuelan oil industry
and would leave Chávez without one of the few clients that pay cash for Venezuelan oil. The
injection of cash from the sale of the company would soon evaporate and the country would lose
long-term, steady income. The sale would accelerate Venezuela's loss of the U.S. oil market, a
process that has been going on for some time now. Only a political change in Venezuela will
reverse this trend."
A: Alberto Cisneros Lavaller, CEO and president of Global Business Consultants:
"The eventual sale of the CITGO refinery complex raises a number of issues, specifically
the impact on the oil industry, economic repercussions for the country and political implications.
With regard to the impact on the industry, there are at least two significant questions to review.
First, this refining complex has deep conversion capacities perfectly suited and fitted to
adequately process Venezuelan extra heavy grades. Currently, between 550,000 and 700,000

barrels per day from Venezuela are processed by CITGO. The other significant issue is the
eventual price of the refinery complex. Usually Venezuelan government estimations are much
lower than market value because they tend to make reference in their transactions to book values
(not commonly used in the industry). With relation to the economic repercussions, the country
will receive lower oil revenues. Official figures suggest that dividends after taxes are very low
and, therefore, not worth it to have such investment in the United States. But oil revenues by and
large would endure significantly due to the relevance CITGO has within all downstream
international integration that Venezuela has nurtured abroad over the years. Last, but not least, is
the question of where the sale proceeds would go. Would they be reinvested in other industry
projects or used to cover government expenditures, completely diluting its effect? With regard to
the political implications, it seems that the sale of CITGO is motivated by Venezuela's desire to
get away from an eventual embargo if ExxonMobil and Conoco win their claims against the
Venezuelan regime. In this consideration, Venezuelan authorities have had a double discourse:
one of harsh ideological rhetoric against 'Yankee imperialism' and another of sustained
commerce and oil trade with the United States. That rhetoric also advances ideas of market
diversification, which would be impossible overnight because of the mutual dependence enjoyed
by both countries (75 percent of Venezuela's exports and 10 percent of U.S. imports). In a
nutshell, if the selling of CITGO would take place, Venezuela would have to close long-term
processing deals with new owners."

The Energy Advisor welcomes responses to this Q&A. Readers can write editor Gene Kuleta at
kuleta@thedialogue.org with comments.

